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ABSTRACT 
 The United States defense industry has been in a constant state of 
consolidation over the past sixteen years. This thesis reports the impact of these 
defense related mergers on the cost of military weapons systems.  The Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SARs) provided the data for this research.  The analysis of 
the data suggests that the defense industry’s consolidation did not result in 
higher costs for the DoD’s military weapons in the post-merger period. This 
report concludes that, on average, approximately 76.4 percent of the weapons 
systems produced by Lockheed Martin, Boeing, or Northrop Grumman, the three 
largest defense contractors respectively, based on 2006-awarded contracts, 
experienced a statistically significant change in their cost estimates.  
 Of the weapon systems manufactured by the “Top Three,” on average, 
66.7 percent exhibited a statistically significant decrease in cost estimates. 
Weapon systems in the fixed-wing aircraft category were most impacted by 
defense-related mergers. About 72.7 percent of the systems in this category 
showed a statistically significant change in cost estimates, of which 63.6 percent 
exhibited a statistically significant decrease in cost estimates. Weapon systems 
in the strategic electronics category were also highly impacted by defense-
related mergers. About 75 percent of the systems in this category showed a 
significant change in cost estimates, of which 50 percent exhibited a statistically 
significant decrease. The Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) summary tables 
provided the cost data for this report. Over 280 military weapon systems, with 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The United States defense industry has been in a constant state of 
consolidation over the past sixteen years. As the number of major defense 
contractors continues to diminish, many are concerned about the impact of these 
mergers on the costs of weapons systems.  The purpose of this report is to 
examine the impact of mergers among major defense contractors on the costs of 
military weapons systems.  
 The Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) summary tables1 provided the 
cost data for this report. SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, 
and technical status.  The period covered in the SAR data used in this analysis 
were between March 1981 and June 2006. This research included over 260 
military weapon systems and more than 6,800 lines of data. A great percentage 
of the weapons systems were eliminated from the analysis for numerous reasons 
— explained in more detail in the methodology section below — in order to 





                                            
1 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology, and Logistics 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/index.html.  
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II. CONDITIONS UNDERLYING CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY  
 The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of declining defense budgets 
and sharply reduced expenditures for military procurement, which forced deep 
cuts in the number and size of weapons programs. In fact, the overall U.S. 
defense budget has decreased from a peak of $390 billion in 1985 (in constant 
fiscal year 1997 dollars) to $252 billion in 1997 — a reduction of about 35 
percent2. More important, from the defense contractors' perspective, however, 
the procurement budget has incurred the brunt of these cuts, shrinking from 
about $125 billion (fiscal year 1997 dollars) in 1985 to about $44 billion in 1997, a 
65 percent reduction3. A decline in demand of this magnitude, which occurred in 
an industry that had invested heavily in plants and infrastructure in the early 
1980s based on expectations of continued growth in the demand for weapons 
and military systems, led quickly to overcapacity among defense contractors4. 
This overcapacity, in turn, contributed to excess overhead and higher costs for 
U.S. military programs. The defense industry responded by reducing capacity 
through consolidation, which has resulted in a significant decline in the number of 
defense contractors. Defense Department officials have encouraged 
consolidation within the industry as an inevitable consequence of shrinking 
procurement budgets. It has been widely reported, for instance, that in 1993 
                                            
2 Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of The Federal Trade Commission, Before The 
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition United 
States Senate (July 24, 1997). 
3 Statement of John B. Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and 
Installations), Before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services,  (April 15, 1997). 
4 Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of The Federal Trade Commission, Before The 
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition United 
States Senate (July 24, 1997). 
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then-Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry urged defense industry executives 
to combine into a few, large companies to eliminate costly overcapacity5.  
 This defense industry consolidation began in the early 1990s with many 
mergers valued at some $300 million. However, the pace accelerated 
considerably by 1993, when the value of defense-related mergers climbed to 
$14.2 billion, topped more than $20 billion in 1996 and, just a decade later, the 
value of defense mergers doubled to reach an astonishing $40 billion6. Some of 
the mergers with the highest value took place in 1993 when Martin Marietta 
purchased General Electric's defense division and General Dynamics' space 
division. At about the same time, Lockheed purchased General Dynamics' 
aircraft division, while Loral purchased LTV, Ford Aerospace, and Unisys. Then, 
in 1994, Lockheed merged with Martin to become Lockheed Martin, and a year 
later, Lockheed Martin purchased Loral to produce a $30 billion giant known as 
Lockheed Martin Loral.   
The combined company, as of 2006, was awarded approximately 40 
percent of the Pentagon's procurement budget7. In 2007, the upwards trend in 








                                            
5 Statement of John B. Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs and 
Installations), Before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services,  (April 15, 1997). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology, Report of the 
Defense     Science Board Task Force on Antitrust Aspects of Defense Industry Consolidation. 
8 Government Printing Office, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/budget/defense.pdf.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 An exhaustive review of literature related to defense merger activity was 
conducted using the Lexus/Nexus database, Internet, journals, periodicals, 
Jane’s Defense, GAO reports, SARs, and testimonies to Congress on the impact 
of defense mergers. Data collection focused on cost data from SARs’ summary 
tables. The cost data was transferred to an Excel spreadsheet as it appeared on 
the SAR summary tables and re-checked to ensure the accuracy of the data. The 
report periods reviewed included data weapons system historical cost data from 
March 1981 to June 2006.  
 An in-depth review of over 260 weapons systems and more than 6,800 
lines of data yielded 46 weapons systems that met the criteria necessary for this 
analysis. Many systems were eliminated because there were not enough data 
points before or after the merger to assess the impact of the merger, or because 
there either was not a merger during the time period covered by the data, or it 
was unclear whether that merger affected that particular weapons system. For 
example, if Raytheon acquired a smaller system during the time period for which 
there was data on a weapons system, that merger would not have been included 
in this analysis if it was unclear that this particular merger affected this particular 
weapons system.  This thesis examines current year cost estimates in base year 
dollars for each weapons system over time because it encompasses many of the 
ways in which a merger could impact costs and because it controls for inflation 
since it is normalized to a base year9.  
 The regression model used current year cost estimates in base year 
dollars as the dependent variable. The independent variables were a time trend, 
to control for changes over the passage of time, and a merger dummy variable 
that took on the value of “1” following a merger of the contractor who made the 
weapons system and a “0” before the merger. The regression model was then 
                                            
9 This follows a similar methodology to  NPS- GSBPP-06-000, a technical report written by 
Dr. Nayantara Hensel entitled “An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns in Defense Industry 
Consolidation and their Subsequent Impact” (2007). 
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run for each military weapons system. In one case, we assumed that the merger 
effect kicked at the SAR date nearest to the merger. In the second case, we 
assumed that the effect kicked in at the second nearest SAR to the merger.  The 
results in Tables 3-6 use the regressions, which assume that the effect kicked in 
at the second nearest SAR10. 
 In using the quantitative approach to process the cost data, relevant 
historical data was obtained. The historical data is numerical, readily available 
and consistent over a long period, and provides insight into the interaction 
between supplier and consumer. The cost data located on the Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR) fits the necessary description for historical cost data 
mentioned above. Given the characteristics of the data, regression analysis was 
the tool of choice to process the cost data.  Regression analysis examines the 
relation of a dependent variable, the “output” or “response variable” to a specified 
independent variable, “inputs or “explanatory variables.” The estimates measure 
the relationship between the dependent variable and each of the independent 
variables. In mathematics, an independent variable is any of the argument, which 
is a statement (premise) or group of statements (premises) offered in support of 
another statement (conclusion).  
 Some of the weapon systems in the raw data set were eliminated for the 
following reasons:  some weapons systems did not have sufficient observations 
(less than 10) for the analysis to be robust/statically significant; this represented 
approximately 60.5 percent of all the weapons systems analyzed. There were 
instances when no merger activity occurred by the original manufacturer of the 
weapon systems in the database between the dates given; this represented 
approximately 36.6 percent of all the weapons systems analyzed. Finally, any 
weapon system or program cancelled by DoD regardless of merger activity or 
defense contractor was not considered; this represented only approximately 2.5 
percent of all the weapons systems analyzed.  
                                            
10 This follows a similar methodology to  NPS- GSBPP-06-000, a technical report written by 
Dr. Nayantara Hensel entitled “An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns in Defense Industry 
Consolidation and their Subsequent Impact” (2007). 
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IV. SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT COST DATA 
 SARs are prepared annually as required by Title 10 USC § 2430 of the 
United States Code and developed in conjunction with the President's budget.  
SARs summarize the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and technical status and 
each contains a great deal of information regarding a particular weapon system. 
Information such as the mission of the weapons system, major and secondary 
contractors involved in manufacturing the system, and data on the costs of the 
weapons system, such as baseline cost estimates and current cost estimates11. 
 The total program cost estimates provided in the SARs include research 
and development, procurement, military construction, and acquisition-related 
operation and maintenance (except for pre-Milestone B programs which are 
limited to development costs pursuant to 10 USC §2432). Subsequent quarterly 
reports are required only for those programs experiencing unit cost increases of 
at least 15 percent or schedule delays of at least six months. Quarterly SARs are 
submitted for initial reports, final reports, and for programs that are rebaselined at 
major milestone decisions. Total program costs reflect actual costs to date as 
well as future anticipated costs. All estimates include anticipated inflation 
allowances. 
On an annual basis, the DoD reports the acquisition costs of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) to Congress. Title 10 USC 
§ 2430 defines a Major Defense Acquisition Program as a 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition program that is not a 
highly sensitive classified program (as determined by the Secretary 
of Defense). Additionally, the Secretary of Defense must designate 
the program as major defense acquisition program. Finally, the 
program must be estimated by the Secretary of Defense, to require 
an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and 




                                            
11Hensel, Dr. Nayantara. NPS- GSBPP-06-000, “An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns in 
Defense Industry Consolidation and their Subsequent Impact,” (2007). 
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constant dollars) or an eventual total expenditure for procurement 
of more than $2,190,000,000 (updated to FY 2000 constant 
dollars)12.  
 Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) are external reports containing 
MDAP information submitted to Congress. The SAR contains information such 
as: an executive summary, the mission of the weapon system, the costs of the 
weapon systems, the contractors involved and much more. Even though SARs in 
their entirety are difficult for the public to obtain, the SAR summary tables, are 
readily available for all interested individuals. A quantitative analysis of the 
impact of defense mergers can be conducted with the cost data contained in 
these reports. The cost data is broken out by weapon system, and provides the 
original cost estimate given to the U.S. government, what it is currently expected 
to cost the US government, and the specific reasons for the cost changes in 
relation to the baseline of the program.  
 The definitions of the cost data reported in the SAR summary tables may 
be found in DoD 7000.3-G, Preparation and Review of Selected Acquisition 
Reports13.  
 
                                            
12 United States Government Printing Office (GPO), United States Code Electronic Edition, 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title10/subtitlea_partiv_chapter144_.html.  




 The tables below represent the results of analyzing SARs’ cost data of 
military weapon systems. Tables 1 and 2 directly below show the results of the 
regressions (statistical analysis) of the cost data gathered from the SARs by 
weapons system. The second and fourth columns have the coefficients of the 
post-merger dummy variable and the time trend, respectively. The third and fifth 
columns provide the p-value for the statistical significance of these coefficients14. 
 
Table 1. Post-Merger Statistical Results Beginning With SAR Closest to 
the Merger Effective Date  
 


















AH-64  36.961 0.763 47.257 0.000
AIM-9X  1554.800 0.000 4.878 0.568
ASAS  -1419.660 0.000 16.395 0.046
AMRAAM  -2826.000 0.000 183.260 0.000
ATACMS  134.470 0.366 29.903 0.000
ATACMS-APAM -62.350 0.889 -12.050 0.575
ATACMS-BAT 1456.657 0.000 32.566 0.073
AV-8B   -113.640 0.001 6.545 0.005
ATICRM  -49.355 0.899 64.324 0.007
C-17  17687.660 0.000 319.770 0.000
C-130J 578.055 0.453 509.426 0.006
DDG-51  -6357.780 0.001 740.820 0.000
F-16 -3235.558 0.031 58.599 0.088
FA-18  -21133.990 0.002 635.600 0.014
                                            
14 Hensel, Dr. Nayantara. NPS- GSBPP-06-000, “An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns in 
Defense Industry Consolidation and their Subsequent Impact,” (2007). 
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F-22  -8867.300 0.151 1074.100 0.000
Javelin  -78.669 0.840 14.043 0.291
JDAM  -669.470 0.032 147.651 0.000
JSOW  542.250 0.609 -9.995 0.827
JSTARS  -1396.200 0.003 168.990 0.000
LHD-1  251.020 0.210 53.764 0.000
Longbow Apache  -381.750 0.612 149.510 0.000
Longbow Hellfire  -759.730 0.033 36.382 0.008
NAVSTAR  -212.399 0.013 29.502 0.000
Titan IV  -9604.985 0.000 504.366 0.000
DMSP  15.714 0.322 6.557 0.000
FBCB2  -422.658 0.180 4.646 0.876
MLRS  -28.854 0.744 28.307 0.000
Strategic Sealift  58.530 0.685 20.624 0.029
T45TS  143.590 0.401 47.809 0.000
Trident  -2111.671 0.056 10.351 0.679
JPATS  744.526 0.047 124.020 0.000
JASSM 365.077 0.396 121.099 0.000
AFATDS 201.654 0.326 -4.534 0.756
ABL -1710.842 0.353 269.662 0.177
E-2C -4905.183 0.000 72.741 0.000
EFV -3392.319 0.001 405.151 0.000
ATIRCM 733.037 0.126 7.203 0.790
Global Hawk 65.339 0.112 50.555 0.094
JDAM -385.267 0.331 133.076 0.000
LANTIRN -37.563 0.612 3.294 0.066
MCS 179.676 0.046 -12.833 0.003
GBS 391.484 0.685 73.087 0.144
FMTV -987.369 0.387 124.471 0.000
ATARS 542.689 0.012 -37.774 0.035
T-AKE -134.735 0.457 -12.775 0.277
THAAD -2513.177 0.358 544.368 0.000
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Table 2.  Post-Merger Statistical Results Beginning With SAR One  
 Period Beyond Closest to the Merger Effective Date  
 











on time trend 
variable  





AH-64  87.880 0.480 45.650 0.000
AIM-9X  1279.300 0.000 9.408 0.422
ASAS  -1004.900 0.002 -8.205 0.733
AMRAAM  -2953.600 0.000 184.600 0.000
ATACMS  234.600 0.108 27.200 0.000
ATACMS-APAM -91.554 0.798 -9.907 0.674
ATACMS-BAT 1201.149 0.005 37.710 0.074
AV-8B  -116.950 0.001 7.088 0.004
ATICRM  255.640 0.504 49.295 0.031
C-17  17138.700 0.000 336.680 0.000
C130J 778.055 0.867 423.921 0.002
DDG-51  -7478.100 0.000 761.470 0.000
F16 -3032.217 0.0543 50.044 0.135
FA-18  -24329.800 0.000 751.150 0.003
F-22  -11220.000 0.067 1127.400 0.000
Javelin  1156.990 0.002 -22.196 0.067
JDAM  -698.650 0.028 149.390 0.000
JSOW  1631.280 0.126 -50.687 0.276
JSTARS  -1300.270 0.005 166.480 0.000
LHD-1  144.320 0.476 55.225 0.000
Longbow Apache  -669.240 0.372 158.100 0.000
Longbow Hellfire  -789.560 0.030 38.132 0.007
NAVSTAR -191.890 0.024 28.756 0.000
Titan IV  -10094.500 0.000 513.140 0.000
DMSP  30.865 0.041 5.910 0.000
FBCB2  -606.340 0.056 22.475 0.456
MLRS  -34.901 0.693 28.377 0.000
 12
Strategic Sealift 93.856 0.506 19.345 0.028
T45TS  63.699 0.707 49.373 0.000
Trident  -1489.630 0.178 -2.125 0.933
JPATS  947.420 0.006 118.270 0.000
JASSM 613.484 0.137 110.752 0.000
AFATDS 113.569 0.576 1.091 0.940
ABL -2503.274 0.103 419.085 0.059
E-2C -4481.181 0.000 62.946 0.000
EFV -3170.661 0.002 401.419 0.000
ATIRCM 616.938 0.198 13.152 0.630
JDAM -395.066 0.327 133.823 0.000
LANTIRN -28.379 0.741 3.096 0.072
MCS 194.908 0.033 -13.599 0.002
GBS 63.547 0.557 7.755 0.0280
Global Hawk -663.769 0.182 69.520 0.039
FMTV -1048.561 0.436 122.812 0.000
ATARS 496.902 0.029 -35.589 0.064
T-AKE -200.498 0.168 -6.049 0.618
THAAD -2641.727 0.164 618.923 0.000
 
 Table 3 summarizes the findings of Tables 1 and 2. In Table 1, the merger 
effect was assumed to have started with the SAR closest to the merger effective 
date.  However, in Table 2, the merger effect was “moved” one period to start at 
the SAR one reporting cycle after the nearest SAR to the merger effective date. 
This action was taken in order to ensure that the merger effect, if any, would be 
completely reflected in the cost data contained in the SARs.  
 Of systems analyzed in Table 3, on average, regardless of whether the 
merger effect kicked in at the nearest SAR or the second nearest SAR to the 
merger, approximately 47.7 percent (note that this is the average of 41.86 
percent and 53.49 percent) exhibited a statistically significant change in their cost 
estimates following a merger, controlling for the time trend.  
 Additionally, on average, approximately 30.2 percent of the systems 
experienced a statistically significant reduction in cost estimates in the post-
merger period, controlling for the time trend, while approximately 17.4 percent of 
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the systems experienced a statistically significant increase in cost estimates in 
the post merger period, controlling for the time trend. 
Table 3. Percentage of Weapons Systems Experiencing a Post-Merger 
Change in Cost Estimates  
 







change             















Post -merger effect at SAR 
closest to the merger 
effective date  
13.95   27.91%  41.86%  
Post-merger effect at second 
nearest SAR to the merger 
effective date  
20.93%  32.56%  53.49%  
Averages 17.44% 30.24% 47.68% 
 
  
 Table 4 summarizes the weapons systems results from Table 2 and 
categorizes those results based on the type of weapons system classification 
found in the 1998 GAO report, although this reports added the strategic 
electronics category. In classifying the systems into these categories, we 
examined materials on the website of the Federation of American Scientists, 
Jane’s, and various materials written by defense contractors.15.  
 Weapon systems in the fixed wing aircraft category were most impacted 
by defense- related mergers. About 72.2 percent of the systems in this category 
had a statistically significant change in cost estimates.  Of these systems, 63.6 
                                            
15 Hensel, Dr. Nayantara. NPS- GSBPP-06-000, “An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns in 
Defense Industry Consolidation and their Subsequent Impact,” (2007). 
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percent exhibited a statistically significant decrease and approximately 9.1 
percent experienced a statistically significant increase in cost estimates post-
merger. Weapon systems in the strategic electronics category were also highly 
impacted by defense related mergers. About 75 percent of the systems in this 
category experienced a statistically significant change in cost estimates, of which 
50 percent showed a statistically significant decrease and approximately 25 
percent showed a statistically significant increase in cost estimates following the 
merger.  
 
Table 4.  Percentage of Weapons Systems Experiencing a Post-Merger 
































0% 100% 100% 









JSTARS   
JPATS  
T-45TS 
9.09%  63.63%  72.72%  
Rotary Aircraft  
AH-64  
Longbow Apache 




50.00%  50.00%  100.00%  
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Surface Ships  
DDG-51  
LHD-1  
Strategic Sealift  
EFV 
T-AKE 
0.00%  40.00%  40.00%  
Strategic 









25.00%  50.00%  75.00%  
Strategic Missile 
Trident II 
0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  





















0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
 
 Table 5 summarizes statistically significant changes in cost estimates by 
defense contractor. The analysis conducted found that on average approximately 
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47.0 percent of the weapons systems manufactured the leading defense 
contractors listed showed a statistically significant change in cost estimates 
following their mergers.  Of these systems manufactured by these defense 
contractors found in the table below, on average, 34.6 percent experienced a 
statistically significant decrease in cost estimates and approximately 19.6 percent 
exhibited a statistically significant increase in cost estimates.   
 In the table below, over two-thirds of the systems made by Boeing, 
General Dynamics, Lockheed, and Martin Marietta, showed a substantial change 
in cost estimates following a merger or acquisition. As can be seen in the table, 
most of the contractors (with the exception of TRW, Beech Aircraft, and Martin 
Marietta) were more likely to have lower cost estimates than higher cost 
estimates. In this analysis, weapon systems manufactured by a contractor who 
was later acquired by another contractor on the list were included only in the 
calculation of the totals for the acquirer.  For example, in the case of Martin 
Marietta and Lockheed, any weapon systems originally manufactured by Martin 
Marietta were accounted as part the combined company Lockheed Martin.  
Systems included in the table below for Martin Marietta were those in which 
Martin Marietta served as the acquirer of the original manufacturer of the weapon 
system.  This action was taken to ensure accuracy and to avoid the double 
counting of the same weapons systems that later became part of the acquiring 






Table 5. Summary of Statistically Significant Cost Changes by Defense 
Contractor  
 
Defense Contractor Percentage of 
systems made 






























or lower)  
Boeing 12.50% 62.50% 75.00% 
BAE Systems 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Bath Irons 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Beech Aircraft 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
General Dynamics 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Hughes  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Lockheed Martin  16.67% 50.00% 66.67% 
LTV 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Martin Marietta 40.00% 40.00% 80.00% 
McDonnell Douglas 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Northrop Grumman  0.00% 33.33% 33.33% 
Raytheon 25.00% 25.00% 50.00% 
Stewart Stevenson 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Texas Instruments 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
TRW 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 







Of the weapons systems included in this analysis, Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, the three largest defense contractors 
respectively, based on 2006-awarded contracts, manufactured approximately 
34.8 percent. Of these weapons systems, on average, approximately 76.4 
percent examined in this report, produced by the “Top Three,” manifested a 
statistically significant change in their cost estimates following mergers. About 
62.5 percent of weapons systems manufactured by Lockheed Martin and 
included in this analysis showed a statistically significant change in cost 
estimates.  Of these systems, 50 percent exhibited a statistically significant 
decrease in their cost estimates.  About 66.7 percent of the weapons systems 
manufactured by Boeing manufactured weapons systems and included in this 
report showed a statistically significant change in cost estimates.  Of these 
systems, 50 percent exhibited a statistically significant decrease in their cost 
estimates.  Finally, all of the systems manufactured by Northrop Grumman and 
included in this report showed a statistically significant reduction in cost 
estimates.  
Table 6 looks at the impact of three major mergers in the defense arena: 
the merger between Lockheed and Martin Marietta (effective on March 16, 1995), 
the merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas (effective on August 1, 
1997), and  the merger between Northrop Corporation and Grumman Aerospace 
(effective on April 18, 1994) on the weapons systems manufactured by these 
prime defense contractors16.  
 On average, approximately 66.7 percent of the weapon systems 
manufactured by General Dynamics and Raytheon, the fourth and fifth largest 
defense contractors based on 2006 awarded contracts, experienced a significant 
change in cost estimates. In general, in the post-merger periods, DoD’s costs 
often tended to be lower for a great number of weapons systems manufactured 
by the leading defense contractors. 
                                            
16Two of these three mergers were examined in Nayantara Hensel’s report “ An Empirical 
Analysis of the Patterns in Defense Industry Consolidation and their Subsequent Impact” (2007). 
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Table 6. Impact of Selected Defense Mergers on Weapons Systems 




(Based on contract 
awards as of 2006) 
Percentage of 
systems made 
by the defense 
contractors 























systems made by 
the defense 
contractors 








(higher or lower)  
Lockheed / Martin 
Marietta  





Longbow Hellfire  
Titan IV  
DMSP  
Trident  
12.50%  50.00%  62.50%  
Boeing / McDonnell 
Douglas  





Longbow Apache  
T45TS  
16.67%  50.00%  66.67%  
Northrop/Grumman 
(April 18, 1994) 
JSTAR 
E-2C 
0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Average 9.72% 66.67% 76.39% 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 This report’s objective was to examine the effect of the defense industry 
consolidation on the cost of weapons systems by analyzing pre-merger and post- 
merger costs to DoD.  
 The analysis of the data suggests that, even though the defense industry 
has undergone a dramatic consolidation, this landscape has not translated into  
higher costs for DoD’s military weapons in the post-merger period. This report 
concludes that, on average, approximately 76.3 percent of the weapons systems 
produced by Lockheed Martin, Boeing, or Northrop Grumman, the three largest 
defense contractors respectively, based on 2006-awarded contracts, showed a 
statistically significant change in their cost estimates.  
  About 62.5 percent of weapons systems manufactured by Lockheed 
Martin and included in this analysis showed a statistically significant change in 
cost estimates.  Of these systems, 50 percent exhibited a statistically significant 
decrease in their cost estimates.  About 66.7 percent of the weapons systems 
manufactured by Boeing manufactured weapons systems and included in this 
report showed a statistically significant change in cost estimates.  Of these 
systems, 50 percent exhibited a statistically significant decrease in their cost 
estimates.  Finally, all of the systems manufactured by Northrop Grumman and 
included in this report showed a statistically significant reduction in cost 
estimates.  
 Weapon systems in the fixed-wing aircraft category were most impacted 
by defense-related mergers. About 72.2 percent of the systems in this category 
had a statistically significant changes in cost estimates.  Of these systems, 63.6 
percent exhibited a statistically significant decrease and approximately 9.1 
percent experienced a statistically significant increase in cost estimates post-
merger. Weapon systems in the strategic electronics category were also highly 
impacted by defense-related mergers. About 75 percent of the systems in this 
category experienced a statistically significant change in cost estimates, of which 
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50 percent showed a statistically significant decrease, and approximately 25 
percent showed a statistically significant increase in cost estimates following the 
merger. 
 Additional research on a larger sample of weapons systems spread 
across multiple sectors is necessary to understand further the effect of defense 
market consolidation on the cost of military weapon systems. Also, consideration 
should be given to changes by DoD in the quantities of weapons systems 
procured.  Finally, the impact of funding levels, defense priorities and political 






EXPANDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES 
 
WEAPON SYSTEM: TITAN IV 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: SPACECRAFT PROPULSION 






FIXED WING AIRCRAFTS 
 
WEAPON SYSTEM: F-16 “FIGHTING FALCON”  
PRIMARY FUNCTION: MULTIROLE FIGHTER  





WEAPON SYSTEM: F-22 “RAPTOR” 
PRIMARY ROLE:  AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER 




WEAPON SYSTEM: FA-18 “SUPER HORNET” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION:  MULTIROLE FIGHTER 





WEAPON SYSTEM: GLOBAL HAWK 
PRIMARY FUNCTION:  




WEAPON SYSTEM: C-130J “HERCULES” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT/AIR INTERDICTION 




WEAPON SYSTEM: C-17 “GLOBEMASTER III” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: CARGO AND TROOP TRANSPORT 




WEAPON SYSTEM: E-8C “JSTARS”  
PRIMARY FUNCTION:  AIRBORNE BATTLE MANAGEMENT 





WEAPON SYSTEM: “JPATS” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: UNMANNED SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT 






WEAPON SYSTEM: AH-64A/D “LONGBOW APACHE” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: ATTACK HELICOPTER 





WEAPON SYSTEM: V-22 “OSPREY” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: ATTACK HELICOPTER 






WEAPON SYSTEM: NAVSTAR 







WEAPON SYSTEM: TRIDENT II 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 









WEAPON SYSTEM: AIM-9X “SIDEWINDER” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: AIR TO AIR MISSILE 





WEAPON SYSTEM: “JDAM” 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT/OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR 






WEAPON SYSTEM: DDG-51 
PRIMARY FUNCTION: MULTI-MISSION GUIDED DESTROYER  




WEAPON SYSTEM: LHD-51  
PRIMARY FUNCTION: MULTI PURPOSE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT  






WEAPON SYSTEM: M2A3 “BRADLEY”  
PRIMARY FUNCTION:  PROTECTED TRANSPORT OF TROOPS 





WEAPON SYSTEM: M1A2 “BRADLEY”  
PRIMARY FUNCTION:  HEAVY ARMOR SUPERIORITY 
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